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FTC v. Actavis, Inc.: When Is the Rule of 
Reason Not the Rule of Reason? 
Thomas F. Cotter* 
When is the lion neither inside nor outside the den?1 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc.2 brings some resolution to the decade-long dispute 
over the level of antitrust scrutiny that is appropriate for 
evaluating the legality of “reverse payment” or “pay-for-delay” 
agreements settling pharmaceutical patent infringement 
litigation between brand-name and generic drug companies. I 
have written at length about this topic before and need not 
devote time and space to rehashing the facts or the arguments 
in favor of various proposed approaches.3 Suffice to say that in 
the past I argued against the Eleventh Circuit’s “scope-of-the-
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 1. Whalen Lai, Koan, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 287, 288 
(Oliver Leaman ed., 2001) (attributing the saying to Mazu Daeyi). 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 3. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent 
Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491 (2002); Thomas F. Cotter, 
Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse Payments: 
Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some Recent 
Scholarship, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069 (2004); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the 
“Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving 
Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN. 
L. REV. 1789 (2003) [hereinafter Cotter, Presumptive Illegality]; see also 
Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: An Analysis, INTELLECTUALIP.COM (Feb. 
25, 2013) http://intellectualip.com/2013/02/25/ftc-v-actavis-an-analysis/ 
[hereinafter Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: An Analysis]; Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. 
Actavis, Case Law, INTELLECTUALIP.COM (Feb. 22, 2013), 
http://intellectualip.com/2013/02/22/ftc-v-actavis-case-law/ [hereinafter Cotter, 
FTC v. Actavis, Case Law]; Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: The Hatch-
Waxman Framework, INTELLECTUALIP.COM (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://intellectualip.com/2013/02/20/ftc-v-actavis-the-hatch-waxman-
framework/; Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: Reverse Payments, 
INTELLECTUALIP.COM (Feb. 21, 2013), http://intellectualip.com/2013/02/21/ftc-
v-actavis-reverse-payments/. 
42 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:1 
 
patent” test, under which the agreement would be legal as long 
as the terms fell within the exclusionary potential of the 
patent, and the infringement action was not merely a sham or 
fraud.4 Instead, I argued for a “presumptive illegality” 
approach, under which proof that a brand-name company paid 
a generic company to settle would shift the burden to the 
settling parties to rebut the presumption of illegality.5 In this 
regard, I proposed that the most important factor in 
determining whether the settling parties have rebutted the 
presumption should be 
the amount of consideration flowing from the brand-name to the 
generic firm. Where that amount is less than the amount of the 
patent owner’s expected litigation costs, this fact alone may be 
sufficient to rebut the presumption, and thus shift to the antitrust 
plaintiff the burden of proving that the anticompetitive harm 
outweighs the procompetitive benefit of the settlement. Under these 
circumstances, the payment may represent nothing more than a 
good-faith effort to avoid litigation costs . . . . Other relevant 
evidence may include the presence of other agreements between the 
settling parties (for example, authorizing the defendant to market 
an authorized generic drug, or licensing the defendant other 
intellectual property rights), which should be taken into account for 
the limited purpose of accurately estimating the value of the 
consideration flowing from plaintiff to defendant; whether the 
generic is “cash-strapped,” and therefore willing to accept a later 
entry date to remain in business; whether the patent owner sought, 
and succeeded in obtaining, a preliminary injunction against the 
generic manufacturer; whether the generic manufacturer agrees to 
waive its 180-day exclusivity, thus removing the risk of a bottleneck 
potentially blocking other ANDA applicants; and whether the patent 
in suit has withstood other validity challenges arising after the 
filing of the settled action. On the other hand, where the amount of 
consideration flowing from patent owner to generic manufacturer 
exceeds the generic firm’s expected profit from the sale of the 
generic drug in question, the inference that the patent owner is 
simply paying a potential competitor to exit the market is much 
stronger, and the presumption of illegality should be very difficult to 
rebut. Moreover, although it probably would not be advisable to 
require the factfinder to estimate the ex ante probability that the 
patent would have been found valid and infringed had the 
infringement action not been settled—a matter that courts in some 
of the reverse payment cases understandably have been reluctant to 
undertake—all that the proposed approach requires is for courts to 
draw appropriate inferences from the amount of the settlement in 
                                                          
 4. See Cotter, FTC v. Actavis, Case Law, supra note 3. 
 5. See, e.g., Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 534–35. 
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comparison to other expected costs and benefits, along with any 
other relevant facts and circumstances.6 
Writing for a 5-3 majority in Actavis, Justice Breyer 
rejected both the scope-of-the-patent test and the presumptive 
illegality approach and held instead that courts should review 
reverse payment settlements under the rule of reason.7 Or so 
the opinion states. In reality, the Court appears to have all but 
in name adopted the presumptive illegality approach it 
purported to reject. One might speculate about the political or 
prudential considerations that went into the majority’s 
characterization of what it was actually doing, but as I read the 
opinion, reverse payment settlements of the type at issue in 
Actavis are now subject to a de facto regime of presumptive 
illegality. In my view, this is a welcome result. 
The reason I characterize the majority holding as adopting 
a de facto rule of presumptive illegality is that, as antitrust 
lawyers are well aware, in practice the rule of reason is hardly 
the sort of open-ended, totality-of-the-circumstances approach 
suggested by Justice Brandeis’s classic definition of the rule of 
reason in the old Board of Trade case.8 Rather, courts tend to 
apply a structured version of the rule of reason,9 which 
Professor Hovenkamp nicely summarizes in his hornbook10 and 
                                                          
 6. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis: An Analysis, supra note 3 (citing MICHAEL A. 
CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 378–82 (2009); Cotter, 
Presumptive Illegality, supra note 3, at 1812–15). 
 7. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230–38 (2013). 
 8. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court: 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as 
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To 
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts 
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint 
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is 
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable 
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help 
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences. 
Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 33–38 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
 10. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 279–80 (4th ed. 2011). 
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which I paraphrase in the following manner in my own 
antitrust classes: 
1. Consider first whether there is a “contract, combination, or 
conspiracy” that restrains trade (in some sense). 
If yes (conscious parallelism coupled with plus factors?), go on. 
If not, § 1 doesn’t apply (the “§ 1 gap”). 
2. If necessary, consider next whether the restraint poses any 
possible risk to competition. I.e., is the restraint at issue one that 
poses a substantial risk of increasing price, lowering quantity, or 
causing some other anticompetitive harm? 
If yes, go on. 
If no, stop; judgment for defendant. 
3. If necessary, consider next whether the restraint is likely to 
generate any plausible, cognizable, procompetitive benefits. 
For example, does the restraint plausibly relate to the core 
activities of a lawful joint venture? 
Is it plausibly ancillary in the sense of being reasonably 
necessary to promote the legitimate activities of a joint 
undertaking? Reasonably necessary for the provision of some 
good or service that consumers demand but which might not be 
provided optimally if each competitor merely followed its own 
individual self-interest? 
If yes, go on. 
If no, stop; it is a naked restraint of trade, likely only to increase 
price or reduce output or quality, and is per se illegal. 
4. If necessary, consider next whether the defendant has market 
power (e.g., through substantial market share coupled with barriers 
to entry), or alternatively whether there is proof of actual 
anticompetitive effects, such as a reduction of output. 
If yes, go on. 
If no, stop; judgment for defendant. 
5. If necessary, consider next whether the restraint at issue 
provides actual (not just plausible) procompetitive benefits. 
If yes, go on. 
If no, stop; judgment for plaintiff. 
6. If necessary, consider next whether the restraint is the least 
restrictive means of attaining those benefits. 
If yes, go on. 
If no, stop; judgment for plaintiff. 
7. If necessary, balance the procompetitive benefits against the 
anticompetitive costs (good luck!).11 
                                                          
 
 11. Thomas F. Cotter, PowerPoint Presentation, Antitrust Overview 
(unpublished document) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cotter PowerPoint]; 
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Assuming that this analysis is correct, what exactly will 
courts be doing when they apply the rule of reason approach to 
pay-for-delay cases such as Actavis? Will they be starting from 
step 1 above? No, because in any case in which a patentee 
agrees to pay money to an alleged infringer in return for the 
latter’s agreement to settle the case and temporarily exit the 
market there is obviously a contract that potentially restrains 
trade; that much is indisputable. Equally obvious is the 
potential risk to competition (step 2). At the same time, there 
are potential procompetitive benefits (step 3), because (as a 
general matter) settlement conserves social resources that 
otherwise would be devoted to litigation and (in this specific 
context) in theory the settlement could speed up the entry of 
generic drugs to the market.12 
Crucially, according to the majority, step 4 above is also 
likely to be present in the context of pay-for-delay settlements. 
As Justice Breyer wrote: 
First, the specific restraint at issue has the “potential for 
genuine adverse effects on competition.” The payment in effect 
amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell 
its product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent 
litigation were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not 
infringed by the generic product. Suppose, for example, that the 
exclusive right to sell produces $50 million in supracompetitive 
profits per year for the patentee. And suppose further that the 
patent has 10 more years to run. Continued litigation, if it results in 
patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement, could cost the 
patentee $500 million in lost revenues, a sum that then would flow 
in large part to consumers in the form of lower prices. 
. . . . 
. . . . 
Second, these anticompetitive consequences will at least 
sometimes prove unjustified . . . . 
Third, where a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified 
anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to 
bring that harm about in practice. At least, the “size of the payment 
from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself 
a strong indicator of power”—namely, the power to charge prices 
higher than the competitive level. An important patent itself helps 
to assure such power. Neither is a firm without that power likely to 
pay “large sums” to induce “others to stay out of its market.” In any 
                                                          
see also Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust 
Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1205–06 (2009). 
 12. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–35. 
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event, the Commission has referred to studies showing that reverse 
payment agreements are associated with the presence of higher-
than-competitive profits—a strong indication of market power.13 
If we have made it all the way through steps 1 through 4, 
what remains? Step 5 asks (in my formulation) “whether the 
restraint at issue provides actual (not just plausible) 
procompetitive benefits.”14 Importantly, the burden of proof on 
step 5 normally rests with the defendant.15 So if, under the 
Court’s own analysis, steps 1 through 4 are satisfied in the 
typical pay-for-delay case and review really kicks in at step 5—
at which point the defendant has the burden of coming forward 
with exonerating evidence—it is a little hard to see how that 
framework differs in any functional manner from presumptive 
illegality.16 
                                                          
 13. Id. at 2234–36 (citations omitted). 
 14. See Cotter PowerPoint, supra note 11. Professor Hovenkamp states 
this step somewhat more forcefully, namely whether there is “strong evidence 
that the challenged practice creates substantial efficiencies by reducing 
participants’ costs or improving product or service quality.” HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 10, at 280. 
 15. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to show the restraint 
in fact does not harm consumers or has ‘procompetitive virtues’ that outweigh 
its burden upon consumers.”); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 
1065 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[o]nce the plaintiff meets the burden of 
producing sufficient evidence of market power, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-
competitive objective”); Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 
(2d Cir. 1997) (“‘[I]f the plaintiff succeeds [in showing an actual 
anticompetitive effect], the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the 
“pro-competitive ‘redeeming virtues’” of the action. Should the defendant carry 
this burden, the plaintiff must then show that the same pro-competitive effect 
could be achieved through an alternative means that is less restrictive of 
competition.’”). 
 16. See Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 36. The Polygram court stated: 
  For reasons we have already explained, we reject PolyGram’s 
attempt to locate the appropriate analysis, and the concomitant 
burden of proof, by reference to the vestigial line separating per se 
analysis from the rule of reason. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Law, ¶ 1511a (“judges and litigants too often assume erroneously that 
the classification, per se or rule of reason, necessarily determines 
what must or may be alleged and proved, made the subject of detailed 
findings, or submitted to the jury”). At bottom, the Sherman Act 
requires the court to ascertain whether the challenged restraint 
hinders competition; the Commission’s framework, at least as the 
Commission applied it in this case, does just that. 
  We therefore accept the Commission’s analytical framework. If, 
based upon economic learning and the experience of the market, it is 
obvious that a restraint of trade likely impairs competition, then the 
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This is particularly so given the Court’s further statements 
that “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to 
answer the antitrust question” and its discussion of the type of 
procompetitive justifications that might excuse a reverse 
payment.17 As for the first issue, Justice Breyer wrote: 
An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally 
suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s 
survival. And that fact, in turn, suggests that the payment’s 
objective is to maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared among 
the patentee and the challenger rather than face what might have 
been a competitive market—the very anticompetitive consequence 
that underlies the claim of antitrust unlawfulness. The owner of a 
particularly valuable patent might contend, of course, that even a 
small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be that as it 
may, the payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent 
the risk of competition. And, as we have said, that consequence 
constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm. In a word, the size of 
the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate 
for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a 
detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.18 
In other words, the plaintiff is not going to have to prove, 
except inferentially by reference to the amount of the payment, 
that the probability of patent invalidity was high. As for the 
second, the Court noted that reverse payments 
may amount to no more than a rough approximation of the litigation 
expenses saved through the settlement. That payment may reflect 
compensation for other services that the generic has promised to 
perform—such as distributing the patented item or helping to 
develop a market for that item. There may be other justifications. 
Where a reverse payment reflects traditional settlement 
considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value for 
services, there is not the same concern that a patentee is using its 
monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding 
of noninfringement. In such cases, the parties may have provided for 
a reverse payment without having sought or brought about the 
anticompetitive consequences we mentioned above.19 
All of this leads me to conclude that the reasons the Court 
chose not to characterize what it was doing as a presumptive 
illegality approach were either (1) political, e.g., to keep one or 
                                                          
restraint is presumed unlawful and, in order to avoid liability, the 
defendant must either identify some reason the restraint is unlikely 
to harm consumers or identify some competitive benefit that 
plausibly offsets the apparent or anticipated harm. 
Id. 
 17. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 18. Id. at 2236–37. 
 19. Id. at 2236. 
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more possibly gun-shy justices on board with the majority, on 
the theory that a rule of reason approach is not quite as pro-
plaintiff as a presumptive illegality approach; or (2) based on 
concerns that courts might construe the adoption of a 
presumptive illegality approach in the present case as 
effectively holding that such an approach is appropriate in 
other cases, not arising in the byzantine shadow of Hatch-
Waxman. The concluding section of the majority opinion seems 
to reflect this latter concern,20 and thus may be viewed as a 
                                                          
 20. See id. at 2237–38. Justice Breyer concluded: 
[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive 
effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s 
anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other 
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any 
other convincing justification. The existence and degree of any 
anticompetitive consequence may also vary as among industries. 
These complexities lead us to conclude that the FTC must prove its 
case as in other rule-of-reason cases. 
  To say this is not to require the courts to insist, contrary to what 
we have said, that the Commission need litigate the patent’s validity, 
empirically demonstrate the virtues or vices of the patent system, 
present every possible supporting fact or refute every possible pro-
defense theory. As a leading antitrust scholar has pointed out, 
“‘[t]here is always something of a sliding scale in appraising 
reasonableness,’” and as such “‘the quality of proof required should 
vary with the circumstances.’” 
  As in other areas of law, trial courts can structure antitrust 
litigation so as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust theories 
too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the other, 
consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the 
minimal light it may shed on the basic question—that of the presence 
of significant unjustified anticompetitive consequences. We therefore 
leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason 
antitrust litigation. 
Id. (citations omitted). I would expect that settlements of patent infringement 
litigation outside of the Hatch-Waxman context will rarely give rise to 
plausible antitrust claims under the rule of reason. In a typical case, 
settlement may increase output (e.g., by resulting in a nonexclusive license of 
a patent that has withstood a validity challenge), thus failing step 2 above; or 
the patentee lacks market power (step 4); or courts will conclude, as a general 
rule, that a settlement lacking any red flags such as the presence of a reverse 
payment in excess of the defendant’s expected profit (or other suspicious 
conditions) necessarily has procompetitive benefits that outweigh any 
anticompetitive consequences that could be proven without unraveling the 
reduction of adjudicative costs that is the primary social good that settlement 
produces (and thus will not countenance attempts to question patent validity 
or infringement absent good reason). But I tend to agree with the majority 
that patent settlements should not be effectively immune from antitrust 
scrutiny absent conduct such as sham or fraud, which arguably was the 
implication of the scope-of-the-patent test. 
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rejoinder to the dissent’s concern that the majority approach 
renders vulnerable even conventional patent settlements.21 
In conclusion, it seems to me that the majority adopted a 
(de facto) presumptive illegality approach to pay-for-delay 
settlements entered into in the shadow of Hatch-Waxman—
precisely the approach that many of us were hoping for22—even 
if, for political or prudential reasons, it suggests that it did not. 
As long as the lower courts correctly interpret the message, this 
seems an acceptable resolution to the pay-for-delay problem. 
                                                          
 21. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2244–45 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 22. See Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business 
Professors and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioners, 
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2233 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 391001. 
  
*** 
